Rising Rhetoric
BBC reports that in his annual Heroes Day speech, LTTE leader Prabakharan called the truce "defunct." He also said, "The uncompromising stance of Sinhala chauvinism has left us with no other option but an independent state for the people of Tamil Eelam." In other words, war.
As an analyst, I believe that this rhetoric does not mean the LTTE is beyond compromise. All indications suggest that there is a solution the LTTE will accept, short of an independent state. Unfortunately, in this case, such a solution is not possible because the government— strongly influenced now by "Sinhala chauvinists"— will not allow it.
Where is this going? Do the Sinhala hardliners believe, as they say publicly, that they can win a military victory over the LTTE— even though they never have before? I tend to think not. Rather, I believe they seek to consolidate their lock on government power— to keep Sinhala civil society (as well as the Tamils) out of the governing process. Once again, this has little to do with the LTTE and everything to do with the Sinhalese. In crude terms, there is a class struggle going on, and the LTTE provides a necessary diversion.
Many years ago, a British peace worker told me something I found shocking at the time: "All the Tamil people really want is not to be a pawn in Sinhala politics." The more I have watched, the more I understand. The real conflict here is not between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. It is within the Sinhalese. And right now, the hardliners are winning.
There is another irony here that must be mentioned: the LTTE began as a violent organization with a few dozen cadres. The BBC report says LTTE has lost 18,700 fighters over the course of its existence— and still numbers in the thousands. War, it seems, has not been a bad thing for the LTTE.
As an analyst, I believe that this rhetoric does not mean the LTTE is beyond compromise. All indications suggest that there is a solution the LTTE will accept, short of an independent state. Unfortunately, in this case, such a solution is not possible because the government— strongly influenced now by "Sinhala chauvinists"— will not allow it.
Where is this going? Do the Sinhala hardliners believe, as they say publicly, that they can win a military victory over the LTTE— even though they never have before? I tend to think not. Rather, I believe they seek to consolidate their lock on government power— to keep Sinhala civil society (as well as the Tamils) out of the governing process. Once again, this has little to do with the LTTE and everything to do with the Sinhalese. In crude terms, there is a class struggle going on, and the LTTE provides a necessary diversion.
Many years ago, a British peace worker told me something I found shocking at the time: "All the Tamil people really want is not to be a pawn in Sinhala politics." The more I have watched, the more I understand. The real conflict here is not between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. It is within the Sinhalese. And right now, the hardliners are winning.
There is another irony here that must be mentioned: the LTTE began as a violent organization with a few dozen cadres. The BBC report says LTTE has lost 18,700 fighters over the course of its existence— and still numbers in the thousands. War, it seems, has not been a bad thing for the LTTE.
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